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NO. 1

POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN
PRESENT-DAY EUROPE

WERNER P. FRIEDERICH



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WERNER P. FRIEDERICH

*Assistant Professor of German and Comparative Literature
in The University of North Carolina*



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5. June, 1935. *Other People's Lives, Fourth Series.* C. S. Love.
6. July, 1935. *The Story of Books.* R. B. Downs.

VOLUME II

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2. January, 1936. *Famous Women of Yesterday and Today.* Revised Edition. C. S. Love.
3. April, 1936. *Adventures in Reading, Eighth Series.* M. N. Bond.
4. May, 1936. *Other People's Lives, Fifth Series.* C. S. Love.
5. June, 1936. *Adventures in Reading. Ninth Series.* A. B. Adams.
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2. January, 1937. *The Modern Woman.* E. C. Baity.
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5. June, 1937. *Adventures in Reading, Tenth Series.* A. B. Adams.
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
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THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CONSTELLATION JULY, 1938

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PREFACE

It would be almost impossible and also quite colorless to write an entirely impartial survey about the political situation in present-day Europe. The author, a Swiss by birth, has at any rate not attempted it, but has frankly injected into these pages much of his own personal opinions. Aware of the fact that the cause of England and France is abundantly championed in this country, he is now championing two groups of countries about which either nothing at all or only unfavorable things are said in the daily press. Out of a sense of love and admiration he has sided with the small neutral nations in their valiant struggle to avoid being crushed by the big powers, and out of a sense of justice and duty he has also defended the cause of the restless Have-Not nations in Europe, namely Italy and Germany. The readers will take these viewpoints for what they are worth, and will no doubt form their own opinions about the whole situation; but even if they should not agree with this booklet, they might in the end possibly admit that there is also some justice in the viewpoint of the other party. And to achieve that much in our modern world, filled with suspicions and misunderstandings, would surely be gratifying enough.

W. P. F.

Chapel Hill, N. C.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Empires—from the times of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar up to Napoleon Bonaparte and our own days—are established by brutal force of conquest. The jungle-law of the survival of only the fittest man, tribe or nation, prevailed in the epochs of bow and arrow as well as in our own period of machine-guns, tanks and airplanes. The weak will always be oppressed, if not exterminated: the fate of the Indians here in America illustrates that point sufficiently. The conquerors will always hold on to what they have conquered, by force as well as by so-called peace-treaties which seem to legalize their conquests. The vanquished, if capable of a national rejuvenation, will always be restless and resentful, biding their time. We witness the same spectacle today: England and France are the static and conservative victors, stubbornly holding on to what they have; Germany is the rebellious and dynamic loser, ready to relieve the “fat-bellied” victors of the superabundance of their spoils. And so the old jungle-game of devouring and being devoured might start all over again.

One modern “invention,” however, tends to confuse this issue: it is the League of Nations. This God-sent Wilsonian idea gave to the French and the British one tremendous advantage over all other victors in all other historical periods: their conquests were “legalized” not only by peace-treaties of the type of Versailles or St. Germain; they were “legalized” also by that utopian institution which bade all nations to outlaw war. Up to 1919, all big nations had been allowed to steal, rape or murder at will; after 1919, however—a date which the conquerors might have wished to emphasize as being more important than the date of the birth of Christ—such things were no more to be permitted. The Millenium had started; the strong should forever remain strong, the weak should forever remain weak. Needless to say, such was not in accordance with the noble plans of Wilson, or the wishes of the enlightened and tolerant neutral states such as Scandinavia, Holland or Switzerland, who had joined the League of Nations. But such an interpretation suited the victors of 1919 best: one thundered loudly about sanctions against war-makers and treaty-breakers who refused to acknowledge such an unjust Millenium, and one said absolutely nothing about those paragraphs in the covenant of the League of Nations which provided for revision of unjust or obsolete peace-treaties. A noble ideal was thus prostituted for the sake of cheap gain, outwardly best demonstrated by the fact that the covenant of the League of Nations to this day is chained to and forms part of the Treaty of Versailles. Even the neutral nations of the world became confused to the extent of defending Versailles when they should have defended only Geneva. Due to this confusion, the system of Versailles has been able to weather more storms than it deserved to, while on the other hand, alas, the bitter and restless enemies of Versailles have also become bitter and unrelenting enemies of Geneva. False friends have made the League a tool of their own ambitions, and to its disappointed admirers of yesterday it is today neither ideal nor universal.

Today's struggle is purely economical, not ideological. The vanquished nations battle against the victorious nations, the Have-Nots against the Haves. The modern political chaos has created many new -isms, all of them desperate, and to a certain extent respectable, attempts to find a way out of this turmoil, just as the world's different religions also try to find an answer for man's spiritual problems. It is a mistake to assume that these -isms are going to fight one another for ideological reasons only—e.g., that Fascism, just for the fun of it, is going to attack Communism. If war ever comes, it will be for economic reasons alone. In the last analysis the theories of Friedrich Nietzsche on the right or of Karl Marx on the left will not be enough to make people destroy each other by the millions. But the supply of wheat, oil, ore and rubber is a big enough question, and that is why the over-saturated Haves, England and France, indirectly supported by Russia and the United States (all of them together possessing four-fifths of the world's wealth), band together against the Have-Nots. Inferiority, hunger and despair were the reasons for the world's big revolutions; they are good enough reasons for our modern wars, too.

Besides these two mighty blocs we find two other groups of nations in the Europe of today: the pawns and the neutrals. The fate of the former is not enviable. They are states, unable to stand aloof, crushed between two millstones. No matter what happens they may be involved in the next war, and fearfully they seek to choose the winning side. Their position is very unstable, for with every move of the big fellows they, the little fellows, have to adjust themselves to the new situation. War to them means not only misery; it may even mean complete disappearance of their independence. As long as the League of Nations seemed to protect them and some of their unjust gains, they were willing to believe in treaties and promises of help; but now some of them are ready to betray their best friends if the other party seems to offer more advantages. A very sad, yet very human picture.

Nor is the position of the neutral nations much more secure. To be sure their national independence goes back not to 1919 only, as does that of some of the pawns. These neutral nations are much older, maturer and richer in political traditions. They have weathered many a storm, the Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, the World War—and maybe they will also manage to keep out of the next war. Who knows? They hope for the best and prepare for the worst. With the exception of Belgium and Denmark they had no share in the spoils of 1919; content with what they possess, they partake neither in the greed of the Have-Nots nor in the guilty conscience of the Haves. It is only too bad that Switzerland, Belgium and Holland are so isolated; if they were located adjacent to the four Scandinavian countries in the north of Europe, these seven nations would, in chaotic Europe, represent at least *one* solid bloc of peace, sanity and progress.

*Subjects for Study***1. Different Governmental Systems of Europe**

Discuss some of the danger-spots of Europe.

Compare the different brands of socialism in Scandinavia, Germany and Russia.

2. Armaments

Was the German rearmament morally justified?

Discuss the importance of raw materials and of colonies. Should they be internationalized?

3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Growing Friendship between England, France, and the United States

Buell, R. L. *New Governments in Europe*.

Heimann, Eduard. *Communism, Fascism or Democracy?*

Rappard, W. E., ed. *Source Book on European Governments*.

Heinberg, J. G. *Comparative Major European Governments*.

Staley, Eugene. *Raw Materials in Peace and War*.

Liddell Hart, B. H. *Europe in Arms*.

Baldwin, H. W. *The Caissons Roll*.

Dunn, F. S. *Peaceful Change*.

Herring, Hubert. *And So to War*.

Howe, Quincy. *England Expects Every American to Do his Duty*.

Shepardson, W. E. *The United States in World Affairs*.

The following books are on the general European situation:

Gunther, John. *Inside Europe*.

Mowrer, Lilian. *Journalist's Wife*.

Lengyel, Emil. *The New Deal in Europe*.

Voigt, F. A. *Unto Caesar*.

The Editors of *Fortune*. *Background of War*.

Saerchinger, César. *Hello, America!*

Young, Eugene. *Looking Behind the Censorships*.

CHAPTER II

FRANCE

In 1919 we all knew that France, with the very essential help of England and America, had won the war. Today we are almost inclined to believe that she lost it.

Democracy, so restrained and disciplined in Britain and in Europe's neutral countries, has achieved its most radical and often absurd forms in France. Of the many political parties no two are likely ever to agree with one another; and recent years have witnessed the sorry spectacle of Frenchmen quarreling with one another, endlessly and violently, even in the face of very grave foreign dangers. Though hoarding the greatest treasure in gold on the European continent, France has had to devalue her franc three times since the war, reducing it to a mere eighth of its former value. In recent years the Popular Front Government, in which Socialists and Communists were leading, undermined the strength and the energy of the nation through a radical labor policy that was much too inconsiderate and rapid. Financially, economically and politically France was brought to the verge of bankruptcy, and the present moderate government of the center parties will have a hard task to put the house in order, to stop the labor troubles and to balance the madly upset budget.

Dissension, strikes and riots in the interior also weakened France's external position. In 1919, when her Negro troops dominated the German Rhineland, France had built up a complete chain of satellite nations around Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria—allies and watchdogs that should forever keep down her former enemies: Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Today, after the fearful rejuvenation of Germany, France can be sure of only one of these former allies, Czechoslovakia, for the others, unwilling to play her game, prefer to sit on the fence. Ever since 1919, when she cheated Italy out of so much of the spoils that had been promised to her, France has also been at odds with Italy, and recent colonial and Mediterranean conflicts have only aggravated their disagreements. With her forty million inhabitants, France, if left alone, is no match for the seventy-three million inhabitants of Germany; and the life-line to Algiers, that might bring her African colonial troops to her help, is threatened by Fascist Italy and Fascist Spain. France's desperate decision to ally herself with the Communists of Russia may or may not be effective; but that alliance, besides alienating the conservative bourgeois of England, has cost her the support of Belgium and possibly also of Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia, and has enhanced Germany's distrust of France's well-known schemes of encircling alliances. Instead of coming to a direct and generous agreement with Germany and Italy, when circumstances were favorable, France clung to her baneful idea that her neighbors were her enemies and that her neighbor's neighbors were her friends. In our own days, France's and the League of Nations' plan of collective security has collapsed, and unless she changes her policy, France, unsupported by her neighbors' neighbors, may well have to face her neighbors alone. Instead of seeing

Germany surrounded by a chain of steel, France herself is today surrounded by three Fascist nations—a sorry situation for those to face, who from 1919 to 1933 outdid themselves in their determination to keep Germany down forever.

Subjects for Study

1. *Blum and Roosevelt*

Compare the French and the American New Deal.

2. *French Problems concerning Poland, Italy and Spain*

3. *France and Germany*

Could some of the present-day chaos in Europe have been avoided if the French national slogan of "Security and Disarmament" had been changed into "Disarmament and Security"?

Werth, Alexander. *Which Way France?*

Fraser, G. & Natanson, T. *Léon Blum.*

Gibbs, Philip. *European Journey.*

Gunther, John. *Inside Europe.*

Mowrer, Lilian. *Journalist's Wife.*

CHAPTER III

ENGLAND

England's age-old policy of balanced powers, i.e., of permitting no continental nation to become too powerful, induced her to be much less vindictive against Germany than France was, and, with an eye on France's military hegemony over Europe fifteen years ago, she contributed much to put Germany, France's counter-balance, on her feet again. Today, inasmuch as Germany has outgrown France, this same policy of balancing powers makes her support France again.

It is most advantageous for England that her socialistic experiment is not a recent one, as it is in France, but that it dates back a good many years to the early MacDonald governments. Since then the rightist elements of England have had time to make up for many of the financial blunders of the Socialists, so that present-day England under Chamberlain is strong and active again, not paralyzed like France. Especially the gigantic Re-armament Program contributes not only in alleviating England's unemployment, but even more in making her word felt and respected again in the affairs of Europe. Labor has been gaining again recently, it is true; but all strife in this beautifully disciplined democracy is subordinated to the one great effort of putting an end to past weaknesses, experiments and panaceas and of becoming one of the great leaders again in the handling of Europe's affairs. The Dominion Statute of Westminster has greatly reduced the dominions' obligations to the mother-country; but London is none the less determined to act and to face the facts. The dismissal of righteous Eden, who behaved as if England in the course of her bloody history had never committed a crime and as if the Have-Nots alone were the villains, is the best proof that Britain wishes to be realistic. The Millenium of 1919 has collapsed; but it is not too late to avoid war. Peace is worth certain sacrifices, the more so since these "sacrifices" are not really sacrifices, but rather rightings of wrongs.

The understanding with Italy was a first step to clear the air, and it was a masterpiece of British shrewdness to buy Mussolini's good-will by more or less acknowledging him to be in possession of — some other man's territory, namely Haile Selassie's Abyssinia. An understanding with Germany, however, will be even more difficult, for it looks as if England here for the first time in her history will actually have to give back something she grabbed: part or all of Germany's former colonies. The road for an agreement with Germany is paved by Hitler's firm promise to avoid the former Kaiser's mistake—his promise that the German navy shall never exceed 35% of the British navy. And if Hitler can induce England to keep her nose out of "his" Central European affairs, London might yet succeed in achieving a peaceful agreement with the second of Europe's "bad men" also. The time for bullying or ignoring the Have-Nots has passed; and Neville Chamberlain may yet, because of his good-will and honest efforts, easily become the greatest statesman of post-war England.

*Subjects for Study*1. *England's Problems at Home*2. *England's Relation to Others*

The new freedom of Britain's dominions.

The ups and downs of the Anglo-French Entente.

Possible British concessions to the Berlin-Rome axis.

England's relations with Russia.

King-Hall, Stephen. *The Empire, Yesterday and Today.*

Bryant, Arthur. *Stanley Baldwin.*

Kennedy, Aubrey L. *Britain Faces Germany.*

Howe, Quincy. *England Expects Every American to Do his Duty.*

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA

Russia continues to be the riddle of Europe. With her tremendous territories, extending from the frontiers of Poland to the frontiers of China, and (as her chronic convulsions prove) with a government that at times seems neither stable nor popular, Russia's wealth of lands and minerals naturally is a big temptation to such Have-Nots as Germany in the West and Japan in the East. Both these potential aggressors claim to hate Communism; but in truth their crusade against it only serves to cover up their own imperialistic designs.

In order to find allies against this peril, Russia has gone through a series of outward metamorphoses, making a naive effort to prove to the rest of the world that she is no longer what she used to be. Since the accursed democratic nations of the West may some day be valuable friends, Russia—naturally a member of the Have-bloc because of her wealth—has covered herself with a couple of sheep-skins in order to look respectable. Under Lenin and Trotsky, Communism has been a world-wide revolutionary movement aiming at the overthrow of all capitalistic governments; under Stalin, however, it is claimed that Communism is a purely Russian affair and that the world revolution has been postponed, if not stopped altogether. After this statement, which makes us wonder about the purpose of the Third International in Moscow, there came a second surprise: Russia joined the League of Nations, and, together with the big capitalistic nations, became the defender of idealism, the protector of the weak. Of all the little nations that were browbeaten by French diplomacy into swallowing this bitter pill, Switzerland alone had the courage to protest against the comedy, giving vent to her feeling that it might be better to make peace in Western Europe (Germany had just then left the League) than to open the gates to camouflaged and destructive influences from the East. And, more recently, there followed the third metamorphosis: Russia, we are told, is now a real democracy, with a constitution and with regular elections. In the face of such statements, designed to appeal to France, England and America, the potential allies against a German or Japanese aggression, we do not wonder that Trotsky from his exile in Mexico thunders at the betrayal of the high principles of Lenin's revolution.

The Western world would like to acknowledge Russia's tremendous efforts in education, hygiene, industrialization and agriculture; but the news, years ago, of mass-starvations in rich rural districts and, more recently, of endless trials, mysterious confessions and brutal executions, tends to overshadow our admiration for the advances made and leave us with a feeling of uncertainty and disgust.

*Subjects for Study*1. *The Evolution from Leninism to Stalinism*2. *Russia's Relation to Others*

Reasons for Russia's renewed coöperation with the western powers.
Changes in the German-Russian relations in the last twenty-five years.
Russia's hand in France and Spain.

Lyons, Eugene. *Assignment in Utopia*.

Feuchtwanger, Lion. *Moscow 1937*.

Delafield, E. M. *I Visit the Soviets*.

Koudrey, Vladimir. *Once a Commissar*.

Duranty, Walter. *I Write as I Please*.

Duranty, Walter. *One Life, One Kopeck*.

Trotsky, Leon. *The Revolution Betrayed*.

CHAPTER V

GERMANY

England and France became firmly united and centralized nations as early as the 15th century. Italy and Germany, however, were lagging behind more than four hundred years in that development: Italy achieved unity only in 1861, Germany in 1871. Even then the German unity was not absolute, for besides the Kaiser there were kings, grand-dukes and dukes who ruled the realm. Only the abdication of all these princes in 1918, and especially the advent of Hitler in 1933, achieved a unity in Germany that is comparable to the compactness of France. Hence an exuberant joy and exaggerated pride about this newly found unity that is at the same time boisterous and understandable. One by one, in the course of the last century, the independent German states were joined together: Prussia, Hanover, Westphalia, Bavaria, Saxony, etc. And the recent union of Austria with Germany was only the last link in that chain, a historical necessity. Being numerically inferior, France could dominate the European continent only as long as the various states of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation were weak and disorganized. The German unity since 1871 meant that France henceforth had to be content with occupying only a secondary rôle—a disadvantage which she, since 1918, has tried to cover up by a system of political alliances with Poland, the Little Entente and, more recently, Russia. To this very moment she does not admit that seventy-three million Germans should have more to say in the affairs of Europe than forty million Frenchmen.

During the 19th century, when Germany and Italy were still busy building up their own national states, England and France had a chance to conquer their tremendous colonial empires. Both Germany and Italy were late in that race for colonies and vital raw materials; hence they are today dissatisfied Have-Nots. Either they were mere "collectors of deserts," as Mussolini once said about Italy, or else, as with the German colonies, they lost them to the Allies, who, not content with nine-tenths of Africa, wished to have all of it. And so Italy and Germany, in spite of the betrayal of 1915 and in spite of mutual suspicions, are comrades-at-arms, whether they like it or not, for—compared with England, France, Russia or the United States—both are common proletarians, virile and ambitious though they may be. If the new slogan of sharing the wealth is good for individuals, it is good enough for nations too; and to them it sounds like a cruel joke that the new saints of 1919 should decree that wars and conquests and sound national expansion should henceforth be forbidden. Could Indian treaties and Mexican protests ever stop America's march to the Pacific?

There is no use denying, then, that Germany today presents a very grave danger of war. Under its strong medieval emperors Germany had ruled half of Europe, from Denmark down to Sicily and from Flanders to Poland. No wonder then that the vociferous ambitions of some Nazis aim rather high. The problem of the German minorities in Eastern and Southeastern Europe is full of dangerous possibilities (3,500,000 in Czechoslovakia, more

than 1,000,000 each in Poland and Russia, 750,000 in Rumania, 620,000 in Yugoslavia, 500,000 in Hungary, etc.), though it seems incredible that Germany should make such an ado about alleged maltreatments of these minorities, if she herself is unwilling to grant the barest humane and decent treatment to the racial, religious and political minorities in her own country. Many of the German ambitions are justified, just as much of the internal Nazi program (Labor Camps, Winter Help, etc.) is excellent. What is unfortunate for the Germans is that they lack the psychological gift of presenting these facts and claims tactfully and diplomatically, and they are therefore disliked even by the very men who would be most willing to recognize the justice of their demands. Men of other nationalities, through centuries of tradition and pride, are silently but resolutely convinced that their own country is the greatest country on earth. The German, however, rejoicing at the newly established unity of his fatherland, is just now in that unhappy period where he tries to convince everyone else (and himself too) that *his* country is the greatest of them all.

Subjects for Study

1. Internal Reconstruction of Germany

2. Germany and Her Neighbors

What are Hitler's plans in Eastern and Southern Europe?

What advantages has the Italian alliance brought to Germany?

Discuss the "race and soil" theory with regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Hitler, Adolf. *My Battle.*

Powell, A. E. *The Long Roll on the Rhine.*

Viereck, G. S. *The Kaiser on Trial.*

"Germanicus." *Germany, the Last Four Years.*

Wolfe, H. C. *The German Octopus.*

Koischwitz, Otto. *A German-American Interprets Germany.*

Roberts, S. H. *The House that Hitler Built.*

Lichtenberger, Henri. *The Third Reich.*

Schuschnigg, Kurt. *My Austria.*

CHAPTER VI

ITALY

Unhappily enough Italy does not present such a clear-cut picture as the other big nations. We know where Germany stands: she wants to regain the first position among the continental powers which she had lost to France in the 17th century. We know where France stands: like every victor she, in the interest of a freer and gentler culture, wants to hold on to what she has. We even know where England stands: she will support the weaker of the two against the stronger—ostensibly for “humanity’s sake,” as the English so cleverly succeed in making us believe; in truth, however, for the sake of her own super-imperialism. But we do not know where Italy stands. Through tradition she is linked with England, through racial bonds with France. But because she resented being treated as an inferior relative by these two powers, and because she had practically no colonies and was therefore a dissatisfied Have-Not, Italy has also been closely allied with Germany since 1882. When, in 1915, she betrayed her German alliance, she was promised heaven on earth by France and England; but in 1919 these promises were broken, and not one square mile of the former German colonies went to Italy. And when, very recently, she set out to do what others had done before her, and conquered Ethiopia, the sudden moral indignation of England and France did not tend toward rebuilding a possible feeling of friendship. To this day Mussolini vacillates between the two European blocs, trying to sell his favors as dearly as possible, and, thanks to the general Franco-German tension, succeeding in constantly enhancing Italy’s prestige. And, though both blocs need him and woo him, they both know that Mussolini is not really to be trusted and that he might double-cross them whenever the advantage of Italy demands it.

On the other hand, Fascism is doubtless more palatable than National Socialism. Fascists at least aim only at political centralization and aggrandizement, while National Socialists, with a thoroughness that is typically German, go much further than that, forcing not only the political but also the spiritual man under the yoke of their conception of philosophy, art, religion, etc. To the Italians Mussolini is merely a political organizer and rejuvenator, a new Caesar with old dreams of Roman imperialism; to the Germans, however, Hitler is more than an astute politician: he is a new Messiah, a bearer of new messages of racial mysticism. The world at large can no doubt deal much more easily with the former than with the latter.

Italy and Germany belong to the most densely populated regions in Europe, each one having about one hundred and forty inhabitants per square kilometer, as compared with seventy-four in France, twenty-four in Russia and only fifteen in the United States. It is clear that such over-populated nations simply *must* have more land and raw materials, and their ambitions are not merely evil designs, but dictated by dire national necessity. Thoughtless critics often point to the fact that the two dictators, in spite of that overpopulation, constantly demand more babies. Even that can be explained.

There are three races in Europe, the Latin, the Germanic and the Slavic. Originally they were probably equal in strength, which we might express thus: 10-10-10. In recent years the Latin race has not only stopped increasing, it has even begun to decrease (e.g., in France). The Slavic race, on the other hand, especially in Russia and Poland, has increased at a tremendous pace, so that the ratio today is perhaps already 8-10-15. If this situation were permitted to continue for another hundred years, the ratio might well become 5-8-20. In other words, not London, Paris, Berlin or Rome, but the Slavs would then dominate Europe. It is to forestall this danger that Mussolini and Hitler cry out for more babies. They want them as a guarantee, a bulwark against Slavic domination of Europe and as a protection of Western European culture. Boston, formerly the center of Puritanism and Anglo-Saxon blood and culture, but today flooded with Irish and Italian Catholics, will understand this German and Italian defense program, though the world at large will wilfully misinterpret Mussolini's and Hitler's attempts to save Western Europe for Western Europeans. What Europe is today, it owes to the genius of Greece and Rome, and later to that of the Germanic nations—and such shall also be the case in the future.

Subjects for Study

1. *Fascist Achievements in Italy*

2. *Italy and Europe*

Examine Italy's alleged grievances against France.

What definite gains can Mussolini expect from his intervention in Spain?

Is the conquest of Abyssinia the only cause for the bitterness that exists between England and Italy?

Explain Mussolini's sudden round-about face concerning Austria.

Do you expect Italian and German interests in the Balkans to agree or to clash?

Ashton, E. B. *The Fascist, His State, His Mind.*


Slocombe, G. E. *The Dangerous Sea. (Mediterranean)*

Matthews, H. L. *Two Wars and More to Come.*

Badoglio, Pietro. *The War in Abyssinia.*

Borgese, Giuseppe A. *Goliath.*

Price, G. W. *I Know These Dictators.*



FRANCE AND HER ALLIES IN THE NINETEEN TWENTIES

CHAPTER VII

THE LITTLE ENTENTE

(CZECHOSLOVAKIA, RUMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA)

The Little Entente, originally a group of French vassals, was established for the twofold purpose of threatening defeated Germany's eastern boundaries and of keeping down the former German allies, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Hungary and Bulgaria, in the treaties of Trianon and Neuilly, in 1919, had lost very heavily. Fully 68% of the Hungarian territories were taken away and given to the Little Entente; Bulgaria was deprived of access to the Mediterranean and of the Dobrudja. No wonder then that the Little Entente nations, like France, hoped to perpetuate this state of affairs; and to them too an abused League of Nations served to lend legality and morality to their unjust gains.

The Little Entente began to grow weaker when Italy undertook to champion the rights of the most brutally suppressed nation: Hungary. And with the rebirth of Germany under Hitler it began to totter even more. The Little Entente could put up a brave and brazen show only as long as the Rhineland was demilitarized, i.e., as long as the French had a chance to overrun Germany and hasten to the defense of their eastern allies. The remilitarization and refortification of the Rhineland was one of the most important events in the history of post-war Europe, for with the strong new German lines of defense, France is automatically blocked off and isolated in Western Europe, and Eastern Europe is more or less at the mercy of Germany. For a time it seemed as if Italy too had certain plans in the Balkans, but with the German annexation of Austria and the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, the Balkan countries are apparently left to German influences.

Aware of the fact that henceforth they will be unable to depend on the help of blocked-off France, the nations of the Little Entente—notably Yugoslavia, and to a lesser degree Rumania—have altered their anti-German policy. To continue being France's watchdogs in the East would have been full of dangers; hence they neutralized their pacts with Paris. It would be going too far to say that Yugoslavia and Rumania are on the German side. All they did was to regain their full liberty to choose freely, unbound by any fatal alliances. To that we must add that France's trade with these three countries is negligible, while Germany is by far their best customer. Germany, the most industrialized nation on the continent, can well use the agrarian products of the Balkans, and Germany and the whole Danube valley are excellent economic complements. For years France could keep up her eastern alliances only by means of military missions and huge military loans; but it is German trade and German business that keep the mouths of these Danubian nations fed. Friendships that are based only upon military loans are likely to lapse; friendships that are based on trade, however, are likely to persist. Furthermore, France made the fatal mistake of allying herself with Russia, an alliance which further alienated Yugoslavia (the center of pro-Czarist sympathies), and Rumania (afraid lest the Communists might take back Russian Bessarabia, which she annexed in 1919).

Czechoslovakia alone among the Little Entente clings to her French alliance, though in her case too German trade far surpasses French trade. More than one-third of this mixed nation's population is made up of hostile German, Hungarian and Polish minorities, and unless these minorities are given autonomy, the danger exists that Czechoslovakia may fall to pieces. Hence her strong reliance upon France, who supports her against a none too friendly Germany. To strengthen her hands against the rebellious minorities and their respective backers in Germany, Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovakia alone, among the Little Entente nations, has followed France in concluding an alliance with Russia. This alliance, however, has doubled Germany's hostility against Prague, for it is argued that the Communist danger has thereby been carried into the heart of Europe. Germany surrounds Czechoslovakia on three sides, and in case of war she could easily strangle her economically (the two great Czech trade-routes to Hamburg and to Trieste lead through German territory), and dominate her militarily. It looks as if Czechoslovakia sooner or later might have to renounce her anti-German alliances, might have to grant far-reaching autonomy to her several national minorities and might have to attach herself to the German economic orbit. The Germans claim to be as unwilling to allow this "spear-head of Communism" (Czechoslovakia is a relatively liberal democracy, though) to aim at the center of their Reich as the English are unwilling to allow a hostile big power to get hold of Belgium and Holland, thus aiming at the center of Britain's strength. Eastern invasions into England by the way of these Lowlands are as dangerous to the British as eastern invasions into Germany by the way of Czechoslovakia are to the Nazis. Czechoslovakia, according to Hitler, should therefore be neutralized and be drawn into the German orbit, the more so since that country is the last obstacle in the way of a German commercial expansion into the Balkans. And England may yet be persuaded that it is her business to rule the waves—but that she should abandon Central and Eastern Europe to the German sphere of influence.

Subjects for Study

1. Yugoslavia

Explain Italy's suddenly growing friendship for Yugoslavia.

2. Rumania

Weigh the pro-French (political) and the pro-German (commercial) ties of Rumania.

3. Czechoslovakia

Study the problem of national minorities in Czechoslovakia.

Are there any reasons for a possible break-up of the Little Entente?

Fodor, M. W. *Plot & Counterplot in Central Europe*.

Macartney, C. A. *National States and Minority Rights*.

Schacher, Gerhard. *Central Europe and the Western World*.

Adamic, Louis. *The Native's Return*.

Alexander, Nora. *Wanderings in Yugoslavia*.

Clark, Charles. *United Roumania*.

Roucek, Joseph. *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems*.

Voncracek, Felix. *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*.

Freund, Richard. *Watch Czechoslovakia!*

POSTSCRIPT, OCTOBER 1, 1938.

Czechoslovakia's dismemberment is a direct consequence of her evasiveness in refusing to grant better rights to her racial minorities. Two years ago she could have made a much more advantageous deal with Hitler, but depending on her military alliances with France, Russia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, she persistently refused to come to terms with Germany. This dismemberment will deprive Czechoslovakia of about one-third of her population: Germany hopes to get more than 3,000,000 Sudetens who have inhabited Bohemia and Moravia ever since the fourteenth century; Hungary claims more than 800,000 nationals who have occupied the left shore of the Danube for almost a thousand years; Poland will gain about 100,000 Poles in the rich Teschen district, whose population is about 75% Polish, 20% German and only 5% Czech.

The Agreement of Munich means many things to many people:

To Czechoslovakia it brings peace instead of war, neutralization instead of dangerous foreign alliances. The French and Russian pacts will be dissolved. With her neutrality guaranteed, Czechoslovakia may become a haven of peace like Switzerland; a strong, united, truly homogeneous nation like Sweden. With 10,000,000 inhabitants, she will be much greater than most of Europe's little countries and, once her wailing is over, she ought to be able to survive.

To Germany it means the "liberation" of the greatest block of nationals who remained outside the boundaries of the Reich after the absorption of Austria. Since the Treaty of Versailles deprived her of 22,000 square miles of land, 6,500,000 inhabitants, 72% of her zinc ore, 65% of her iron ore, 57% of her lead ore, 45% of her coal wealth, she considers the territorial and industrial gains in Austria and Sudetenland a compensation for these losses. The Danubian Valley is now open to her, and as long as she is satisfied with economic domination and does not resort to military conquests, there is little chance that anybody will stop her.

To the former French satellites in Eastern Europe it means that they have definitely backed the wrong horse and that they must come to terms with Germany if they have not already done so. The Little Entente is dead, with Rumania and Yugoslavia turning to the Balkan Entente instead. Not only the economic, military and judicial paragraphs of the Treaty of Versailles, but also its territorial clauses have now for the first time been broken. This fact will haunt such countries as Poland and Rumania which together shelter about 12,000,000 "undelivered" Ukrainian, German, Jewish and Hungarian minorities.

To Italy the meeting at Munich means a possible rebirth of Mussolini's pet idea: a Four Power Pact of England, Germany, France and Italy which up to now has been blocked by Russia, Poland, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente.

To France the neutralization of Czechoslovakia means the loss of the last anti-German bulwark in Central Europe. The system of protective and encircling alliances has now completely broken down. Now that the house of cards which Clemenceau and Poincaré built has collapsed, France will have to find a completely new foreign policy. She may come to an agreement with Germany, or she may henceforth restrict herself to Western Europe and to her colonial empire alone and may renounce all ambitions in Southeastern Europe. However, the crisis leaves her with one great gain: her alliance with Britain is today firmer than ever.

As to England, by guaranteeing the neutrality of dismembered Czechoslovakia, the English have for the first time in history assumed definite obligations in Central Europe—a thing which they had always vowed they would never do. More than that, they have unmistakably shown to Hitler that there are principles for which they will fight. The Nazis have been made to realize that there are limits beyond which they cannot go, that there are problems which can and must be settled by mutual agreement and not by brutal force. This indeed (and not the transfer of Sudetenland to its legitimate owner) is the one great feature of the Munich Agreement. It leaves us hoping that henceforth the dictatorships and the democracies—not the dictatorships alone—will rule over Europe.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BALKAN ENTENTE

(GREECE, TURKEY, YUGOSLAVIA, RUMANIA *also* BULGARIA)

The Balkan Entente is animated by a somewhat nobler spirit than the Little Entente, for—especially on the part of the Greeks and Turks, who after centuries of discord have buried their hatchet—it is really devoted to friendship and good-will. Bulgaria (which is not yet a member of the Balkan Entente), has still many just grudges against her neighbors, especially against Rumania, Yugoslavia and even Greece; but for the time being we see a real effort towards collaboration and peace.

The reason is simple: it is the common fear of the big powers by the little nations, and especially since the breakdown of the League of Nations, with its principle of collective security, the little fellows are compelled to stand together. United they might achieve better results than individually. Neither Greece nor Turkey trusts Italy's aims in the Eastern Mediterranean. French influence has decreased rapidly, while German influence in the last five years has been steadily growing. In Greece and Bulgaria fully 50% of the trade goes to Germany and that, of course, represents a tremendously effective weapon in the spreading of German prestige. Nor does the fact that Germany plans to build quite a powerful river-fleet on the Danube contribute to the pacification of Southeastern Europe. There is fear of German pressure, and only Turkey, still on rather friendly terms with Russia, may be able to withstand this steady advance of the Nazis. Hard pressed by their political and economic problems, all of these nations have assumed more or less dictatorial forms of government, since dictatorial ruthlessness alone seems to be able to keep down the widely divergent trends among the distressed populations.

Subjects for Study

1. *Greece and Turkey*

Old Greek and Turkish resentment against Italy.

The perfect reconciliation between Greece and Turkey.

Modern Turkey as a leader among the Near Eastern Nations.

Social progress in Turkey; the new position of womanhood.

2. *Bulgaria*

The isolated position of Bulgaria.

Mitrany, David. *Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe.*

Ladas, S. P. *Exchange of Minorities.*

Linke, Lilo. *Allah Dethroned.*

Froemgen, Hanns. *Kemal Ataturk.*

Gardner, E. A. *Greece and the Aegean.*

Schütze, Gladys H. *Where East Is West. (Bulgaria)*

CHAPTER IX

POLAND AND THE BALTIC STATES

The movement of defection from dangerous French alliances started with Poland, whose national pride resented its state of vassalage. Of all new nations created by the treaties of 1919, Poland is by far the most important; and if the much discussed Four Power Pact (England, Germany, France and Italy) ever comes about in Europe, it will probably have to be altered into a Five Power Pact, including Poland. Russia would thereby be completely pushed out of Western European affairs; but the inclusion of Poland would take due cognizance of the importance of the Slavic element in Europe.

Poland, with her wide open frontiers, is literally between the devil and the deep sea, for she hates Russia and thoroughly distrusts Germany. The Polish-German pact of friendship in 1934 was hailed as a paragon of bilateral treaties (as opposed to the League idea of collective treaties); but it was dictated by political expediency only (Germany needed a friend in the East in order to be free in her undertakings against the Southeast) and not by mutual love. The Poles would be foolish indeed to believe that Germany has given up the hope of reconquering the so-called Polish Corridor that separates East Prussia from the rest of the Reich. Other questions (Czechoslovakia, Colonies, etc.) may for the time being be more important to the Germans, but Poland's turn will still come. One "solution" has often been mentioned which would reunite German lands and at the same time give to Poland a much desired access to the Baltic Sea: Poland, with the pleased acquiescence of Germany, might swallow up Lithuania and the Nazis would then renounce all claims to Memel, the German-inhabited harbor of Lithuania.

Apart from making the mistake of treating Poland as an inferior nation, France made a big blunder in her Russian treaty, for the Poles, mindful of the war against the Communists in 1920, positively do not like the new alliance made by their old ally, France. In between the German and Russian dangers, Poland naturally tries to be as independent and as strong as possible; but if it should come to the worst, she would probably side with the Germans rather than with the Russians. If Hitler's hatred of Communism should ever start a war, Germany's road to distant Russia might lead through either the Baltic States, or Poland, or Czechoslovakia and a small section of Rumania. Poland has decided that *she* will not become the battle-field between these two fighting -isms. Moreover, Poland, through an already existing anti-Russian pact with Rumania and a planned pact with the Baltic States (and possibly Finland), intends to erect a barrier between Germany and Russia that would extend from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. Such a barrier would, by the way, also render impossible any Russian help to Czechoslovakia, and would hand the latter over to Germany.

Her semi-dictatorial government, her anti-Semitism that she has in common with most of the countries of Southeastern Europe with large

Jewish populations, and her claim that she is a Have-Not nation which should be given colonies, make Poland a natural sympathizer with many of Hitler's ideas. For the time being, however, she does well to struggle as bravely as she possibly can to keep herself from being drawn into the maelstrom.

The Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia, tiny republics formerly part of the great Russian empire, have a hard time politically and economically. They do not trust their Russian neighbor, nor do they like the quickly growing German navy in the Baltic Sea. In a war between Germany and Russia they could easily become the victims, and the sympathy they would receive from the Scandinavian countries across the Baltic would not be of much assistance to them. In spite of their precarious situation, the spirit of democracy has not disappeared among them as much as it has among the other Eastern European nations.

Lithuania is the most directly threatened nation of the three. About fifteen years ago she lost much of her territory, including her own capital, to Polish conquerors. At about the same time Lithuania, tempted by the weakness of the German Republic, dared to annex Memel, which was supposedly a mandate of the League of Nations. The League did nothing to prevent that raid, but Germany has not forgotten and will not forget.

Subjects for Study

1. Poland

The cause behind the Polish-Lithuanian crisis of 1938.

Weigh the Polish arguments in favor of coöperation with France—or with Germany.

Poland's internal evolution from a democracy to a semi-dictatorship.

2. The Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia

The struggle for democracy in the Baltic States.

The precarious situation of Lithuania.

Karski, Stefan. *Poland, Past and Present.*

Machray, Robert. *The Poland of Pilsudski.*

Davies, E. C. *A Wayfarer in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.*

Buell, R. L. *New Governments in Europe.*

CHAPTER X

ALBANIA, HUNGARY AND IRELAND

The little country of Albania under King Zog is practically an Italian vassal. If Italy, always a doubtful factor in European politics, should ever decide to oppose the German penetration of the Balkan States, Albania would serve as an excellent foothold. Bulgaria too, whose queen is an Italian princess, might show some Italian sympathies. But as long as the Rome-Berlin axis of friendship persists and as long as Italy is busy colonizing her new African empire, the value of Albania for Italy is commercial (oil) rather than strategic. Up to some years ago Albania served also as a spearhead against Yugoslavia who, as long as Belgrade was strongly pro-French, was a bitter enemy of Italy. But now that Yugoslavia begins to turn away from Paris, towards the Rome-Berlin axis, the strategic importance of Albania has decreased considerably.

Hungary will never give up her emphatic demand that the peace-treaty of 1919 be thoroughly revised. If Italy and Germany, her best friends, advise her to ease her demands because they wish to detach the Little Entente from France and hence do not wish Hungary to upset these plans, she might do so in the case of Yugoslavia, who did not take so much away from her. But she will not ease her demands upon Rumania, who took the lion's share, or Czechoslovakia, whose unity, attacked by the rebellious minorities, seems to be tottering in a manner most auspicious for Hungarian hopes.

During the years of the impotent German Republic, Hungary and Austria were the special protégés of Italy. With the growth of Hitlerism things have changed. Austria has returned to her German Motherland, and Hungary may indeed change patrons and become a German rather than an Italian protégé. If the problem of Austria did not break the Rome-Berlin axis, it is not likely that Hungary will do so, and it may be that Mussolini, proud of his African empire, will turn the whole Danubian problem over to Hitler. Germany and Hungary are on excellent terms, and their friendship and mutual respect go back to the days of the World War when they were loyal comrades-at-arms. Hungarian wheat and German industrial products boom a mutually very satisfactory trade between the two nations. Commercially Hungary will doubtless more and more be drawn into the German orbit. It is only to be hoped that this proud and fine little nation will be able to maintain its full political and intellectual independence. But, alas, the elasticity of the supposedly only commercial German aims is very considerable; and Hungary, together with the rest of the Danubian states, justly fears that worse things might follow after this economic penetration. France could not stop it, and England would not be likely to interfere too much in the affairs of Southeastern Europe. The only hope for the Balkan States, it seems, is a quarrel between Hitler and Mussolini, for Italy alone might possibly safeguard the political, though not the economic, independence of these nations.

Ireland tends more and more to become a neutral nation wholly inde-

pendent of the British Empire; yet, since it is doubtful whether she can keep out of Europe's coming conflicts, we might just as well mention her here among the pawns. After centuries of oppression, Eire at last experiences a national rebirth that takes due cognizance of her rich cultural past. Her valiant struggle for independence was an epic truly comparable to the Swiss, Dutch and American wars of liberation. Her only grief after her proud victory over all hardships is the fact that the northern Protestant provinces around Ulster are still English and separated from the new Irish Republic. The future may possibly appease the flames of religious fanaticism that keep Northern Ireland from joining the rest of the islanders in constituting one united nation.

In case of a European war against England, Ireland would of course be of utmost importance, for if dominated by England's enemies she would become a dangerous spearhead against Britain. Rumors, in which Eamon de Valera was depicted as a semi-dictator, have indeed, in the days of the Italo-British tension, alluded to a possible Italian "interest" in Ireland. Others, remembering Germany's support of Ireland's cause during the World War, suggested possible German ties. Such rumors can most likely be dismissed altogether, for Ireland will certainly be wise enough to keep out and stay out of all foreign entanglements.

Subjects for Study

1. *Albania*

The economic and military penetration of Albania by Italy.

2. *Hungary*

The lands and the people that Hungary lost after the World War.
What are the chances of a restoration of the Hapsburgs?
Hungary's relations with the Rome-Berlin axis.

3. *Ireland*

Arguments for and against a union of Ulster with Ireland.
The military and diplomatic relations between Ireland and England.

Swire, Joseph. *King Zog's Albania*.

Macartney, C. A. *Hungary and her Successors*.

Bandholtz, H. H. *Undiplomatic Diary*. (Hungary)

Starkie, W. F. *Raggle-tangle*. (Hungary.)

O'Connor, Frank. *Death in Dublin*.

O'Malley, Ernie. *Army Without Banners*. (Ireland)

CHAPTER XI

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

The Civil War in Spain is not yet entirely over, but practically everyone realizes that General Franco will certainly win. It is rather misleading to call Franco a Fascist. His rebellion against the socialistic and communistic government of Spain was supported by so many elements—the bourgeois, the capitalists, the army, the church, and a large part of the peasantry—that it is impossible and incorrect to label these conservative groups as Fascist. Foreign intervention, however, transformed the war more and more into an ideological struggle. French Socialists and Russian Communists did their best to support their Spanish fellow-proletarians; Germany, bent upon exterminating Communism wherever she sees it, supported Franco, and Italy did likewise, because if she can gain a foothold in Spain she might seriously threaten the British lifeline to India and the French lifeline to Northern Africa. Germany furthermore greatly welcomed the idea that a third dictatorial state would now bound France—a situation which will make France think twice before she interferes with the German plans in Eastern Europe. In this foreign intervention Italy certainly contributed most, then followed France, then Russia, and last of all Germany, who restricted her help to a few thousand highly trained specialists.

The devastation, the misery and the hatred in Spain will undoubtedly call for a very strong government when the war is over, i.e., for a dictatorship, possibly combined with a restoration of the monarchy. Radical left-wing experiments in government have not ended well in Europe—neither in Germany and England ten years ago, nor in France and Spain more recently. The trend is towards greater conservatism, nationalism and traditionalism, in which the uprooted internationalism of the proletarian classes is to be replaced by a more national type of socialism. General Franco, no more than Hitler or Mussolini, will ever wish to suppress the laboring classes; but he will insist that national discipline take precedence over strikes, riots and class-struggle. Spain, agriculturally and industrially rather a rich country, may under Franco possibly experience a national rejuvenation; but in spite of her rightist sympathies, she will not necessarily side with the belligerent Have-Nots. And England, who by keeping out of the struggle has wisely avoided all hatred, and who is the only real financier with whose help the devastated country can again be built up, may yet be the nation most popular with the Spaniards of all classes.

Portugal, another link in the chain of European dictatorships, is traditionally bound to England. The Civil War in Spain has somewhat changed that unquestioning dependence, for in recent years Portugal has eagerly collaborated with General Franco, Mussolini and Hitler, in suppressing Communism in Spain. It would, however, be premature to attach Portugal to the Rome-Berlin axis, though the breaking off of her diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia might point in that direction. Like all other small nations of Europe that were bound by treaty to some big power, Portugal

probably only wanted to become more independent of her former ally, to be able to make her own decisions in case of war. The unconfirmed but persistent rumor that England, instead of giving back to Germany her former colonies, might perhaps suggest that Germany should take hold of the rather extensive Portuguese colonies in Africa, might be a further argument in favor of greater independence and self-reliance.

Subjects for Study

1. *Spain*

- Do you consider the Spanish Non-Intervention Committee in London useful or harmful?
- Outline the various stages of the Civil War.
- The case for Loyalist Spain.
- Franco's new type of government.

2. *Portugal*

- Reasons for Portugal's support of the Spanish Rebels.
- Portugal's colonies, past and present.

- Knoblaugh, H. E. *Correspondent in Spain.*
- Cardozo, H. G. *The March of a Nation.*
- Chaves Nogales, M. *Heroes and Beasts of Spain.*
- Paul, Elliot. *The Life and Death of a Spanish Town.*
- Peers, Allison. *The Spanish Tragedy.*
- Rotvand, Georges. *Franco Means Business.*
- Gordon, J. & C. *Portuguese Somersault.*

CHAPTER XII

SWITZERLAND, BELGIUM AND HOLLAND

Switzerland, an independent democracy since the 13th century, has been invaded only once, by Napoleon's armies in 1798. Her eternal neutrality, the very pillar of her foreign policy, has been acknowledged in several treaties of the past centuries. When she joined the League of Nations in 1920 this neutrality was likewise respected, for she was absolved from the duty of ever having to take part in military sanctions decreed by the League against treaty-breakers. However, since she believed in the fundamental justice and universality of the League, Switzerland was ready to forego her economic neutrality, and during the Abyssinian crisis she took part in the economic blockade of Italy. Today, with the system of universal peace and collective security broken down, and with the big powers making mutually convenient agreements, thereby leaving the little countries in the lurch, Switzerland has justly demanded that not only her military but also her economic neutrality be acknowledged. For, being on three sides surrounded by dictatorial states that are not members of the League, Switzerland, for the sake of a noble idea, is not willing to stick her head into a lion's jaws, to blockade her two best customers and then to be stabbed in the back by some gentleman's agreement among the big wire-pullers. Let it not be said that little states like Switzerland, Holland and the Scandinavian countries undermine the League by slowly backing out of its most dangerous paragraphs; the big powers have undermined the League and destroyed faith in collective security. Switzerland, with her four national languages a little league in herself, would be glad to keep on believing in and supporting the League; but with her neutrality comes first, and wishful thinking and humanitarianism only second. Until the moment comes when the League will rise above partiality and imperialistic interests, Switzerland and the other small nations of Europe can no longer effectively coöperate with what used to be their dream and their fondest hope.

In Switzerland, as in most neutral countries, democracy has been kept fully alive. The political maturity of this little country made it impossible for any -ism to take root there. The Fascism of Italy and Germany is as distasteful to her as France's irresponsible and experimenting leftist government. Shrewd economy and a conservative government have made Switzerland a relatively very wealthy nation, though she has no raw materials, no colonies, and no access to the sea. Her army, her mountains and her fortifications tend to make the country as strong and independent as possible. The absorption of Austria by Germany has dangerously doubled her German frontier; and the fact that France's eastern border is so well fortified that a German invasion would only be possible by way of Belgium, or Switzerland, lends additional gravity to her situation. Yet her strict neutrality and her democratic strength may help her weather the storms ahead as they helped her weather those of the past.

Democratic Belgium, ruled by a beloved monarch, has been a staunch

ally of France since the German violation of her neutrality. Yet in recent years even Belgium, in spite of her sad experience, resolved to return to absolute neutrality, and she therefore dissolved her military partnership with France. Paris' Russian pact was fraught with dangers, and Belgium very wisely did not wish to become involved in an ideological war that was none of her business. If France, by treaty bound, should ever decide to rush to the help of Czechoslovakia or Russia, Belgium wished to have no part in it. She preferred to return to an absolute neutrality (for whatever it was worth) and have it acknowledged by France, England and Germany.

A liberal government of bourgeois and of moderate socialists guard Belgium against the pitfalls of radicalism. Internally only the problem of the relationship between the French speaking (Walloon) half and the Germanic speaking (Flemish) half of the population has caused frictions, for Belgium has unfortunately not yet succeeded in solving the problems of different languages and different cultures as well as Switzerland has done. The Flemish "inferior" parts of the country aired a number of just grievances; but now that they have been made full equals with the Walloons in the administrative and intellectual life of the nation, it is to be hoped that this scarcely hundred-years-old nation will face a happy period of internal and external peace.

Independent since the end of the 16th century, Holland's sturdy bourgeois have succeeded in building up a prosperous little empire and in keeping out of trouble—though they too, like the Swiss, were later overrun by Napoleon's armies. Holland's neutrality is a fact, though it is not specifically acknowledged as is the Swiss or the Belgian neutrality. But it is none the less effective, and the Dutch know that England, unwilling ever to have another neighbor across the channel, will always hold a protecting hand over them. If it should come to the worst, Holland, envied by such Have-Nots as Japan for her rich Asiatic possessions, would certainly be on the side of the democratic Haves. As is the case with all neutral nations, a great sense of tradition and individual responsibility prevents the Dutch from ever running wild in their government. Like the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, they preferably devote their energies to sound social legislation, good schools, hospitals, and solid insurance companies, rather than to big navies and grandiose ambitions. Moral and physical cleanliness, progress, decency and tolerance mean more to them than international intrigues. American newspapers tell us plenty about their favorites, England and France, and about their villains, Germany and Italy; but if they wish to write about quiet work, liberal institutions and broad culture, it is to Holland, Sweden and Switzerland that they turn. For such little nations today represent the best qualities that are still left in Europe.

*Subjects for Study***1. Switzerland**

Note the similarities between the American and the Swiss type of governments.

Study the different cultural and linguistic constituents of Switzerland.

Do you think that the independence of Czechoslovakia could be saved if she were transformed into a federal state of the type of Switzerland?

2. Belgium

Analyze the reasons for Belgium's withdrawal from the French alliance.

The foreign sympathies of the Walloons and the Flemish.

3. Holland

Holland's relations to England and Germany.

The Dutch colonies.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES (SWEDEN, NORWAY, DENMARK, FINLAND)

Since 1918 Finland, which up to that date was part of the Russian empire, has been added to the original three Scandinavian states—though the Finns are not Germanic at all, as Sweden, Norway and Denmark are. A similar mentality and a similar wish for neutrality brought these four nations together, although the Swedish minority in Finland still has to fight against many odds. All four countries are thoroughly democratic and economically sound. As in the case of Holland and Belgium, so also the kings of Denmark, Sweden and Norway are very popular and very unpretentious. Finland, like Switzerland, is a republic. Of all Scandinavian nations Sweden is by far the most important. She has the largest territory, the greatest population and the greatest wealth in minerals. There was a time around 1700 when Sweden thought that conquests and imperialism made for real national greatness. But today she knows better and has realized, together with the other neutral nations of Europe, that peace, industry and tolerance make for greater happiness and for better national prestige.

In her foreign policy Finland is strongly anti-Russian, Sweden is traditionally pro-German, while Norway and Denmark veer more towards England. But these unofficial sympathies cannot break their unity, or weaken their will for neutrality. Though largely ruled by moderate Socialists, these Scandinavians cannot help feeling a bit flattered by the Nazi eulogies of Nordic men and Nordic culture, for a Swede really represents a much purer type of the Nordic race than the average hybrid German. The unwise decision of Denmark (who had not taken part in the World War) to claim various districts of Schleswig-Holstein in 1919, at a moment when defeated Germany could not object, may yet bring unpleasant surprises to the Danish government; but otherwise Scandinavia should have nothing to fear from Europe's quarrels. Even more secure is far-away Iceland, likewise settled by Scandinavian fishermen and peasants, an island in the Atlantic that acknowledges the King of Denmark as its ruler.

Subjects for Study

1. Internal Affairs of Scandinavia

Analyze some aspects of the sound social legislation in Scandinavia.

2. Foreign Policies of Scandinavia

Discuss the justice of the Danish claim of Schleswig-Holstein.

Naval problems in the Baltic Sea.

Rothery, Agnes E. *Sweden, the Land and the People.*

Sweden, Ancient and Modern; ed. by the Swedish Traffic Association.

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CHAPTER XIV

TWO GREAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH)

During the first ten years of its existence the League of Nations was able to make some headway, and the admission of the former World War enemies even gave rise to the hope that such problems as territorial adjustments, redistribution of mandated colonies and abolition of one-sided disarmament, could be settled peacefully. The first severe blow came when Japan, unwilling to be reprimanded for her establishment of Manchukuo as a puppet state, quit the League; and a second even more severe blow followed when Germany, impatient at the slow acknowledgment of her good will and indignant about the persistent evasions of the year-old disarmament conference, likewise withdrew from the League. Other defeats followed, and the League's failure to stop the wars in South America, in China proper, in Abyssinia and in Spain showed that the scope of the League had been much too widely drawn and that even its most partial members, happy though they were to use it as a threat against the Have-Nots, hesitated to use force in order to preserve the *status quo*. For a long time Italy seemed to hope that the League might yet again become universal in its scope and impartial in its dealings, for in spite of the severe criticism levelled at her on account of the conquest of Abyssinia, she remained in the League, thereby clearly indicating that she was still ready to march with the western powers. But even that hope failed. The League, instead of reforming itself, disassociating itself from the Treaty of Versailles and raising itself above the quarrels of its members, more and more became an instrument of one party only, intent upon safeguarding the Haves against the Have-Nots, even to the extent of forcing the small neutral nations into her dangerous schemes and sanctions. And so Italy too left and joined Japan and Germany in their regrettable but understandable scorn of Geneva.

The Catholic Church, still today a tremendously important force in European politics, is likewise beset with many difficulties. It was to be expected that nations which believe in dynamic growth and evolution should clash with the Church and the League, both of them institutions that are rather conservative and repressive. In Russia and Red Spain on the one hand and in Nazi Germany on the other hand, Catholicism has found enemies that are resolved to curtail the political power of the Church and to restrict it to religious affairs alone. Only Italy of all dictatorial powers has managed to come to terms with the Vatican, for everywhere else national politics, education and culture are so thoroughly influenced by the Catholic Church that many Europeans envy America for the clear-cut and unambiguous separation of the state and the church that is to be found there. Germany's and Russia's efforts to extol the political above the spiritual community has naturally caused a closer understanding between the different Christian faiths than would have been possible a few decades ago; yet because of its compact organization and unquestioned leadership, the Catholic world repre-

sents a more formidable obstacle to the secular innovations of the modern dictators than the widely divergent and disorganized Protestant sects of Northwestern Europe.

Subjects for Study

1. *The League of Nations*

Appraise the social, humanitarian and hygienic work of the League.
The history of the sanctions against Italy.

What reforms of the League of Nations would you suggest?

Was America's membership in the League in 1919 desirable—and is it now?

2. *The Church in Europe*

Discuss the Pope's support of Austria against Germany.

What is the Church situation in Germany?

What do you think about the proper relationship between Church and State?

Christianity and Communism.

Martelli, George. *Italy Against the World*.

Slocombe, George. *A Mirror to Geneva*.

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CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSION

Dynamic Europe of today does not present a reassuring picture. War and greed continue to ravage that continent, and men seem to pay no attention to such teachings as the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount. Even the League has failed in its original scope.

And yet—we must keep on believing in the possibility of a just and fair League of Nations. If the wars in the Chaco and in China prove too cumbersome for Geneva, let it be a League of European Nations only, but at any rate a League in which we can put our faith and hope. We bitterly need such an ideal and, like religion, we would have to create one if it did not already exist. Let the League, during our dark period, keep on living at all price; let it busy itself with commercial, hygienic or social problems, if right now it is not able to handle political problems. But let it persevere!

America's refusal to join the League in 1919 was the beginning of its downfall. For it thereby lost its universality and above all its impartiality, and became nothing but a tool for the perpetuation of the *status quo*. Many wrongs will have to be righted; the problems of Czechoslovakia, of the Corridor, of the Colonies, of the territories taken from Hungary and Bulgaria will have to be settled, before the League will encounter a half-way stabilized and pacified atmosphere which will enable it to become a political institution again. Its paragraphs about revision of peace-treaties should take the first place in the covenant, its paragraphs about sanctions should take the last place, and not *vice versa*.

If ever she can do it at all, Europe will solve her problems alone. She does not need America's help. In the face of constant American preaching, several European statesmen have justly pointed out that there should be a Monroe Doctrine for Europe. The average American can not really appreciate Europe's difficulties unless he realizes that in a territory smaller than the United States there live five times as many people as in America. Only then can he perhaps visualize the difficulties, the constant friction, hatred and jealousy of nations that for centuries have had no real elbow-room. Vast empty plains may make for peace and generosity; crowded villages and valleys, however, make for constant pressure, constant explosions. Some nations have found not only an outlet for their populations and energies but also unexpected riches and raw materials in big colonial empires; but other nations, which are even more densely populated, have been denied the right to own more land. The lucky Haves might of course argue that the Have-Nots should be satisfied to send their surplus populations into foreign lands across the seas (where they are lost to their mother-country), and to purchase the necessary raw materials from England, France or Holland, as Switzerland for instance does. To the Have-Nots, however, such arguments seem unjust and idle, for like England, Russia or America they want to have their cake and eat it too. Which brings us to the conclusion

that the political philosophy of the small and the big nations of Europe is quite different, and that both groups cannot really be compared. To the former it is Peace and Wisdom, to the latter Strength and Glory, that represent best the ultimate political ideals of their governments.

Subjects for Study

1. *The Haves*
2. *The Have-Nots*
3. *The Pawns*
4. *The Spectators*

From current news review the present day situation with the above countries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Blue Ribbon Books, 386 Fourth Ave., New York.
Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York.
Council on Foreign Relations, 45 E. 65th St., New York.
Coward-McCann, Inc., 2 W. 45th St., New York.
Devin-Adair Co., 25 E. 26th St., New York.
Dodd, Mead & Co., 449 Fourth Ave., New York.
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First Meeting: INTRODUCTION

1. Different Governmental Systems of Europe
2. Armaments
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Growing Friendship between England, France, and the United States

Second Meeting: FRANCE

1. Blum and Roosevelt
2. French Problems Concerning Poland, Italy and Spain
3. France and Germany

Third Meeting: ENGLAND

1. England's Problems at Home
2. England's Relation to Others

Fourth Meeting: RUSSIA

1. The Evolution from Leninism to Stalinism
2. Russia's Relation to Others

Fifth Meeting: GERMANY

1. Internal Reconstruction of Germany
2. Germany and Her Neighbors

Sixth Meeting: ITALY

1. Fascist Achievements in Italy
2. Italy and Europe

Seventh Meeting: THE LITTLE ENTENTE

1. Yugoslavia
2. Rumania
3. Czechoslovakia

Eighth Meeting: THE BALKAN ENTENTE

1. Greece and Turkey
2. Bulgaria

Ninth Meeting: POLAND AND THE BALTIC STATES

1. Poland
2. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia

Tenth Meeting: ALBANIA, HUNGARY AND IRELAND

1. Albania
2. Hungary
3. Ireland

Eleventh Meeting: SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

1. Spain
2. Portugal

Twelfth Meeting: SWITZERLAND, BELGIUM AND HOLLAND

1. Switzerland
2. Belgium
3. Holland

Thirteenth Meeting: THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES


1. Internal Affairs of Scandinavia
2. Foreign Policies of Scandinavia

Fourteenth Meeting: TWO GREAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. The League of Nations
2. The Church in Europe

Fifteenth Meeting: CONCLUSION

1. The Haves
2. The Have-Nots
3. The Pawns
4. The Spectators



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- Vol. IV, No. 12. *Children of Old Carolina.* Historical Pageant for Children. Ethel T. Rockwell. Price 25c.
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